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Abstract
Two decades ago, when China economically entered Western Europe for the ﬁ rst time, two 
dominant narratives emerged. Th e ﬁ rst one claimed that China’s involvement constitutes 
a great development opportunity for European continent; the other one declared that it’s 
a serious security threat. Th ose two discourses on China remain dominant until now and 
the opportunity vs. threat dichotomy can now also be applied to Chinese’s policy towards 
Central and Eastern Europe. Th e answer for the dichotomy is both. China’s engagement 
means a great opportunity for development for Central and Eastern Europe. Th e success, 
however, is uncertain. It may never fulﬁ ll due to external factors and the drawbacks may 
overshadow the beneﬁ ts.
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Три площадки: безопасность, экономика и новое неизвестное. 
Сложные отношения между Китаем и Центральной и Восточной 
Европой
Аннотация
Статья посвящена важной проблеме внешней политики Китая и Центральной 
и Восточной Европы. В статье анализируется современный политический дискурс 
на Западе, где преобладают два главных нарратива о Китае: Китай как шанс и Китай 
как угроза. Сейчас эти дискурсы появляются и в Центральной и Восточной Европе: 
одни считают Китай угрозой, другие – шансом для стран региона. Автор описывает 
политику Китая в Центральной и Восточной Европе, ответ на неё со стороны стран 
региона.
Ключевые слова: Китай, Центральная и Восточная Европа (ЦВЕ), 1+16, Один пояс 
и один путь
Theoretical Introduction
The theoretical introduction to this article will be based on a broad rea list attitude (combining classical realism, neorealism and neoclassical real-
ism) to politics in general and international relations in particular, combined 
with some aspects of the constructivist school (as the lines that separate them 
are not always very clear) as well as asymmetry theory.
In China realism (in its different forms) remains the dominant school 
of political thinking, though naturally embodied in local understanding, 
vocabulary and discourse; in China foreign policy is almost always viewed 
through the bluntly realist lens of immediate material interests and military 
security. This is somehow natural: having such traditions as the ideas of 
Sun Zi and Han Feizi, the Chinese could be called Godfathers of realism. 
That is why realist approach to politics seems perfectly adequate to China: 
“the ruling elites (...) Beijing have been brought up in a realist strategic 
culture that emphasizes the element of struggle in an often viciously com-
petitive world, where power relations dominate at the expense of allegedly 
universal values” (Lo, 2008, p. 76). Thus, in China political realism remains 
the unrivalled school of political thinking, though it is expressed in their 
own language and local wording (here the constructivist aspect of this 
theoretical introduction must be added, Reus-Smith, 200, pp. 487–509; 
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Copeland 2000, p. 187). Traditionally China has acted according to realist 
assumptions in international relations, but based not on the objective 
structure of the international system, but rather on a specific historical 
strategic culture – the roots of Realpolitik in China are ideational and not 
predominantly structural (Johnston, 1995). In other words, China always 
follows its interests, not universal values; but these interests are understood 
in the Chinese way, in accordance with Chinese beliefs and system of 
values.
In understanding the cultural and ideational background of Chinese 
interests, one must take into account the historical heritage of China, par-
ticularly the world order with China at the center before 1842, or the tianxia 
system (“all under heaven”, Mancall, 1971, pp. 3–38). The tianxia system was 
“an abstract notion embodying the idea of a superior moral authority that 
guided behaviour in a civilized world” (Babones, 2016). This world order did 
not necessary involve any significant political control by China, however, “it 
did require the lesser political entities to recognize a hierarchical structure 
with China at the apex”(Maung Aung Myo, 2011, p. 1). That is why the 
Western colonialism (“hundred years of national humiliation”, bai nian guo 
chi) was such a profound shock for the Chinese elites – all Chinese political 
actions after 1911 (and certainly after 1949) may be understood as ways to 
liberate China from its sorry condition and bring back the former glory (to 
“regain its right place”). Since 20th century, too, China has tried to reconcile 
its own historical legacy with the Western-dominated system. Since Deng 
Xiaoping’s reforms Beijing has decided that the cornerstone of its approach 
to the international order would be peace and development (Deng Xiaoping, 
1985; Bolesta, 2015).
China chooses peace not as a philosophical abstract, nor even as a good 
propaganda slogan, but as a practical political philosophy that originates 
from realistic assumption of its own limitations. In other words, China pre-
fers peace and rejects war, but not out of moral reasons. Chinese pacifism, 
contrary to European, does not originate from rejection of war as a political 
mean, but derives from a pure political rationale. It’s a reference to classical 
Sun Zi thought where it is better not to conduct a war unless it is absolutely 
necessary – war is a risky, uncertain and dangerous mean of politics (Sun 
Tzu, 1910). The essence of this approach is based n the following assumption: 
A R T Y K U ŁY 64 
it’s pointless to use force and risk own casualties, if the same result may be 
achieved through diplomacy or intrigues (ibidem).
That is why Deng Xiaoping and his collective leadership decided that 
they need space for reforms – China needed to have secure and peaceful 
environment to modernize and establishing stable geopolitical environment 
until now remains top national priority (Bijian, Nolan, 2013). That is why it 
stresses “peacefulness” and “non-confrontational” (Pan Guang 2007, p. 46; 
Zhao Huasheng, 2007, pp. 158–159). The peaceful approach is very beneficial. 
Cooperation with China usually play stabilizing role – countries that trade 
with China sooner or later realize that is more profitable to maintain stability 
and gain benefits on economic cooperation than to fight with each other; 
this is how Chinese engagement promotes peace. This is what Hungarian 
Prime Minister Victor Orbán meant when he praised China’s: “key role in 
safeguarding global peace and maintaining the necessary global balance in 
order to preserve peace” (Orban, 2015).
Since Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream and his new foreign policy strategy 
(from 2014), however, China’s actions started to move beyond Deng’s con-
sensus and became much more assertive. Xi called for a new development 
model and two centenary goals: completing the building of a moderately 
prosperous society by 2021 and – more importantly in the context of foreign 
policy: realizing the Chinese Dream of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation 
(Xi Jinping, 2014, p. 38). In other words, these goals, particularly the latter 
one, challenge Deng’s “tao guang, yang hui” concept (though without naming 
it). Nevertheless, despite Xi Jinping’s assertiveness, China’s rise is still based 
on stability and peace around the world (Finkenstein, 2000; Cohen 2006, 
p. 52) and its policy is subjugated to pragmatic goals of building regional 
security and the development of economic cooperation (Bijian, 2005). To 
fulfill these goals, China needs domestic and international peace and that is 
why China’s foreign policy is based on economic logics; its aim is to establish 
favorable international environment for China’s unstoppable development 
and modernization (domestic development keeps the legitimization of the 
CCP). Besides, China aim is to gain access to markets, obtain foreign in-
vestments (particularly advanced technologies), building connections with 
international environment that secure permanent development (Zhiquan 
Zhu, 2010; Goldstein 2005, pp. 102–176; Wang Jisi, 2004). Simply put: China 
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must develop to survive (and to become the dominant great power again 
later on), and to develop, it needs contact with the world.
The shown above realist approach must be theoretically supplemented by 
the asymmetry theory as China-CEE relations are naturally asymmetrical in 
favour of China, as 16 countries constitute a “B-grade group” inside EU (Fürst, 
Tesař, 2013) (which EU itself is now China’s minor partner). The asymmetry 
theory explains the fundamental reality of unequal power amongst states 
and the impact of power’s variables on states policies. Conceptually, in ac-
cordance with asymmetry theory, the asymmetry between China and CEE 
can be described in a few ways. The first one would naturally be the Lowell 
Dittmer’s “positive asymmetry” model that is characterized by economic 
dependence, but not enmity (as in his “negative asymmetry”), where chief 
beneficiary (China) continuously deludes or coerces lesser beneficiary (CEE), 
while the lesser beneficiary turns a blind eye on it by believing that this is 
a temporary necessity (Dittmer, 1985, p. 485). Nevertheless, Ditmmer’s model 
was predominantly a Cold War model intended to explain dynamism in 
USA-USSR-China triangle and as such not compatible for the present times. 
That is why more theoretically valuable will be Brantly Womack’s asymmetric 
theory framework. According to him, “normal” relations between states are 
neither symmetric nor hegemonic, but rather constitute a comprehensive 
matrix of agreements with autonomy and deference being exchanged in 
increments rather than complete structural shifts. Here “negotiated hierar-
chy” rather than dominance and subservience are the most frequent norm, 
whereas acknowledgment for deference (AFD) is a stable alternative to war 
between unequal states. This AFD paradigm works in accordance with the 
following logic: the stronger side (here: China) is more resourceful, but less 
committed to bringing about specific results in the bilateral relationship, 
while the weaker side (CEE) is more vulnerable and therefore more alert 
to threat and committed to survival (Womack, 2010, pp. 372–403). That 
is why China and CEE would fit into Womack’s category of “normalized 
asymmetry”. China-CEE relations are asymmetrical (in favour of Beijing), 
but asymmetry in international relations does not necessarily mean that the 
more powerful partner dominates the less powerful one or that the weaker 
one is hopeless. In the Womack’s “normalized asymmetry”, the relationship is 
not harmonious, but both sides are confident of fulfilling their basic interests 
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and expectations of mutual benefit (ibidem). Finally, China-CEE relations 
can be described by Krystof Kozáks’s Asymmetric Option Model. Both sides’ 
approach towards one another is “open”, which translates into resolving bi-
lateral issues cooperatively. China as the stronger partner acts to promote 
a stable asymmetric relationship, knowing that this is Beijing’s responsibility 
as the stronger partner to minimize misperception and increase involvement 
in its relations to the weaker partner; and to promote voluntary deference 
instead of facing resistance (Kozak, 2010).
China in Central and Eastern Europe
Central and Eastern Europe has long been absent in the Chinese zou chu qu 
(going out) strategy – in regard of Chinese investments, Central and Eastern 
Europe is one the least affected regions in the world (Bruner, 2010; Scissor, 
2010). The CEE countries still remain unknown, if not mysterious, for most 
of Chinese elites – “Most Chinese businesses are only vaguely aware of the 
existence of (let alone the vast differences among) the 16 CEE countries 
(…) If a Chinese businessperson merely learns that Poland is known for 
apples while Latvia is known for trees, that’s progress” (Babones, 2016). This 
neglect has started to change in early 2010s with the introduction of 1+16 
formula in Warsaw in 2012, supposing to become a kind of foothold in the 
European Union – China has been “trying to parlay its economic heft into 
bigger diplomatic influence in Europe, especially in cash-strapped states in 
the east and southeast” (Johnston, 2016) CEE region has also been considered 
as a place to improve China’s image – buying political goodwill is one of 
Beijing’s unstated purposes (Turcsányi, Matura, Fürst, 2014, pp. 127–141). 
Judging from present perspective 1+16 formula has had difficulties to start 
working out, for grouping such different – on many levels from geographical 
(Balkans, Baltics, Central Europe), cultural (various religious background, 
from Catholicism via Orthodox Christianity to islam; different pace of 
secularization and very much different social attitudes), political (non-EU 
members and EU members, pro and anti-Russian to mention the most 
important ones) to legal – countries must have been challenging (ibidem). 
It indicated China’s limited of understanding and knowledge of the CEE 
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region. What do Albania and Estonia have in common? Or Montenegro 
with Lithuania? Tourism perhaps. And little else.
Although China has developed bilateral relations with single CEE coun-
tries such as Hungary, Serbia, Latvia and Czech Republic (the most Chi-
na-enthusiastic of all mentioned) (ibidem), when taken as a whole picture, 
the Chinese policy towards the CEE region until 2015 couldn’t be considered 
successful. Naturally, in order to save face, Beijing did not admit the previous 
failure of the 1+16 formula–forums have been organized and meetings have 
been held–but the lack of substance was clearly seen. In 2012–2015 the lack 
of enthusiasm in many CEE countries, stimulated by a reserved approach 
originating from European Commission and other Western European zones 
of authority (Vasic, 2016), made it likely that the whole idea would soon 
blink into oblivion.
The new wind into 1+16 was blown in autumn 2016 with the inclusion 
of 1+16 format into the OBOR concept and attempts have been made to 
synchronize it with Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (Kaczmarski, Jakóbowski, 
Hyndle-Hussein, 2015). This has enhanced the already existing pattern where 
it is China which is the “driving force of the 16+1 project” (Turcsányi, Matura, 
Fürst, 2014, pp. 127–141). This itself was accepted by CEE countries, as they 
strive to adjust their foreign policies to fit in with a more non-Western global 
world (Long Jin); this is particularly evident in Hungarian PM Victor Orbán’s 
Eastern policy which strives to “catch wind from the East” (Szunomar, 2015, 
pp. 60–78).
The New Silk Road, or to be correct, Silk Road Economic Belt/Corridor 
(later: One Belt One Road, OBOR) Initiative was announced by Chinese 
President Xi Jinping in Astana in September 2013. On September 7th, 2013, 
Xi presented five most important policy recommendations: to strengthen 
policy communication, to improve road connectivity, to promote trade facil-
itation, to enhance monetary circulation and to strengthen people-to-people 
exchanges (President Xi Jinping…, 2013). The most important part of his 
speech came when he urged to “improve traffic connectivity so as to open 
the strategic regional thoroughfare from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea, 
and gradually move toward the set-up of a network of transportation that 
connects Eastern, Western and Southern Asia” (Xi suggests…, 2013). This 
laying down an elaborate and enormously expensive network of high-speed, 
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high-volume railroads as well as oil and natural gas pipelines across the vast 
breadth of Eurasia is “a breathtaking project to put in place an infrastructure 
for the continent’s economic integration” (McCoy, 2015).
OBOR, however, became something more – “a versatile instrument of 
Chinese policy”, in both the regional and global dimensions (Kaczmarski, 
2015). In encompasses many features typical for Chinese diplomacy. It is 
deeply rooted in the historical context – it “directly refers to the glory days 
of the Chinese civilization, when China was the centre of the world and 
was dominant within its neighborhood”; it is becoming a “key element of 
China’s public diplomacy and soft power” (it’s a kind of ‘packaging’ for China’s 
economic expansion, lending it an attractive form”); and also meant to be an 
illustration of the Chinese philosophy of international relations where all the 
countries engaged are winners (a popularization of the win-win formula) – it 
is “intended to promote the image of China as a ‘benign’ power”; finally 
it is a flexible formula of flexible formula of dialogue and a base for the 
development of Chinese political influence (ibidem).
As with other projects, 1+16 was simply incorporated into the OBOR 
agenda, which followed a general line of Chinese politics: “The idea of the 
New Silk Road became a political superstructure (…) and provided grounds 
for measures already undertaken by China which had previously been treated 
as autonomous moves of a bilateral or multilateral nature. Existing projects 
or investments in progress can be incorporated into the new concept without 
additional moves or costs” (Ibid.). This happens also in a way “automatically”, 
as Chinese agencies include almoust every idea to the umbrella of OBOR to 
please the central leadership. Despite the motivations, however, this move 
has revived the China-CEE cooperation and helped (perhaps) to conceal the 
previous failure of 1+16 formula. This is how China saved its face.
The renewed Chinese interest in CEE region was evident during the 
November 2015 1+16 meeting at Suzhou. “Suzhou guidelines” (Suzhou 
Guidelines, 2015) was adopted along with the plan for cooperation until 
2020 (The Medium Term Agenda, 2015). The most important proposals 
focus on creation of new infrastructure bank for CEE (that would be a tool 
for export-import financing), development of transport infrastructure, 
logistics, industry (manufacturing equipment for transportation needs) and 
agriculture cooperation (Kaczmarski, Jakóbowski, Hyndle-Hussein, 2015). 
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Chinese plans, at least official and public, focus on business development 
and investment – “China’s goal in these countries is mainly to boost Chinese 
infrastructure exports; China has developed the world’s largest infrastructure 
industry and is keen to keep that industry fully employed through export 
sales. The CEE countries are seen as prime markets” (Babones, 2016). This 
supposedly originates from economic motives: “Having developed its global 
presence In Africa, Asia or Latin America for decades, China had to find 
new and maybe somewhat less obvious partners” and has to utilize every 
possible chance to find business projects for the overcapacity of its compa-
nies and for its abundant financial assets (Turcsányi, Matura, Fürst, 2014, 
pp. 127–141). The economic priority of 1+16 was evident in the fact that 
the Suzhou summit was hosted by Li Keqiang, whose main portfolio is the 
domestic economy, not Xi Jinpeng, who handles sovereign and foreign affairs 
(Babones, 2016). Besides that China considers Central and Eastern Europe 
a potential hub and regional countries start to share this vision by believing in 
opportunities connected to it (those countries, such as Poland, Hungary, and 
Czech Republic will compete for this role which in turn increases Chinese 
leverage over CEE).
Being the transit point is nothing to be ashamed of for CEE region. From 
Beijing’s point of view, this is one of the region’s main advantages, if not the 
only one. In this respect, CEE is quite privileged by geography. Moreover, 
Beijing believes that the absence of history of conflicts will help to decrease 
social resistance to Chinese initiatives and win the ideological war over 
hearts and minds of Eastern Europeans. China has one trump card here: the 
hopes for Chinese funding: grants, loans and investments (Szczudlink-Tatar, 
2013). And these are important given the fact that China’s engagement may 
create a new way of development for Central and Eastern Europe’s counties. 
Although China’s trade with Central and Eastern Europe is only about 10% 
of Beijing’s total trade with the EU (Szunomar, 2014, p. 178) and the region 
will not be the main beneficiary of the influx of Chinese goods, it may, 
however, become a key transit point, a “gateway” to the Western Europe via 
inland and maritime ports. Regional infrastructure is the main challenge 
here, particularly the lack of standards; incomplete double tracks railway lines 
and the lack electrification. Here, China may help with modernization and 
electrification of railways (Szczudlink-Tatar, 2013). If the cooperation with 
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China succeeds, the poor CEE countries may find the way of development 
whereas those already developed CEE countries may keep on developing.
This may happen also thanks to a fact the closer links between CEE region 
and China may help CEE companies to enter Chinese market. As Polish Gov-
ernment’s informal strategy on China indicates, the real chances for success 
in China lies in Western China, in such provinces and regions as Qinghai, 
Gansu, Ningxia and Xinjiang (most notably, with Lanzhou New Area, the 
economic hub of Western China) which present more opportunities than the 
cooperation with the entire country or only with the eastern provinces, where 
the “Chinese cake” has already been eaten by a (too) strong competition from 
Western companies (ibidem). This regionalisation of efforts could become 
the hallmark of the CEE region’s economic presence in China. Opportunities 
are open companies in industries and sectors such as mining, petrochemical, 
environmental protection, biomedical, pharmaceutical, green technologies, 
agriculture processing, chemicals (ibidem).
Moreover, there are prospects for boosting trade. Polish example here is 
striking – the Chengdu-Łódź direct cargo rail link. This link may become 
Poland’s trump card due to the basic facts: the “rival” link Chongqing-Xin-
jiang-Duisburg takes 16 days, whereas Chengdu-Łódź 12 days. Furthermore, 
Chengdu-Łódź is much faster than the sea passage (40–50 days) and is much 
cheaper than air cargo. Alongside with establishing of a handling centre 
for goods moving in both directions and/or link the container terminal in 
Małaszewicze near the Belarusian border with the project the Chengdu-Łódź 
cargo rail may become one of Poland’s main economic assets in the OBOR 
idea (ibidem).
The most important outcome of cooperation between China and Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe may be a chance for a “structural change” in CEE 
(Lubina, 2016, pp. 183–197). The influx of Chinese capital, if it materializes 
(see below) may offer a chance for a third massive inflow of capital into the 
region (the first one after transformation in 1989 and the second one after 
joining European Union in 2004) and a possibility of establishing north – 
south transportation line (railways and roads linking Southern Europe with 
Northern Europe, ibidem). China has already “conquered” geography at home 
(by building railways to Tibet and establishing a nationwide system of high 
speed railways), now Chinese technology may help to remove the geographic 
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obstacles (mountains, lack of roads etc.) that blocks in linking Balkans with 
the Baltics. Thanks to Chinese capital such projects as via Carpathia may 
materialize. This in turn would not only help to accumulate the capital in 
the region but also may help to overcome the obstacles of present model of 
EU-dependent development which, although beneficial, has its own limi-
tations for CEE (ibidem). “Catching the Chinese wind” – to paraphrase one 
leader’s sentence – would be a chance for further development of the CEE 
EU members countries, once the EU structural founds stop coming in the 
early 2020s.
Coming back to reality: obstacles
The above mentioned scenario is a dream worth dreaming; one, however, 
should remember that this is a distant and uncertain possibility. For now 
there are serious obstacles on the way that overshadow the optimistic scena-
rios presented above. Several major ones must be mentioned and each single 
one may dash hopes for the fulfilling OBOR grand scheme.
Therefore, to start with most obvious issue, the openness and vagueness of 
the OBOR project raises questions of how concrete it is. Its main objectives 
are not clearly defined, and its nature is imprecise. The Chinese analyst like to 
say that this project is planned for generations and for decades which raises 
questions, whether it is at all real. It may turn out to be a simple propaganda 
effort, without any real effects on China’s foreign policy. The lack of any 
qualitative change in the instruments at the disposal of the ‘16+1’ (China 
“merely announced the creation of new models of financing, and invited 
more Chinese and international financial institutions”) (Kaczmarski, 2015) 
may indicate this kind of doubts. Moreover, there are objective problems that 
may be crucial obstacles to the development of existing railway connections 
between China and Europe, such as customs procedures, differences in rail-
way systems, the lack of goods that could be exported to China, and the fact 
that it is still cheaper to send containers by sea (and it will remain so for long).
Moreover, economically speaking, CEE is much constrained in its China 
policy not only by European Union and its general policies, like trade barriers 
or visa policies, but also by the “semi-peripheral” (to use Wallerstein’s term) 
structure of the region’s economies. Most of CEE countries GDP are being 
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made by small and medium enterprises which are in themselves not a match 
for big Chinese state companies – they “are usually too weak to facilitate 
their own business relations with Chinese counterparts” (Turcsányi, Matura, 
Fürst, 2014, pp. 127–141). Furthermore, the economic structure (dominance 
of Western companies) hinders possible cooperation. Here the following 
example is illustrative: “in the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia approximately 90 percent of exports to China is produced by foreign 
owned multinational companies. It is clear that governments in Budapest, 
Bratislava or Prague cannot really influence such trade relations; no matter 
how good (or bad) their relations are with Beijing” (ibidem).
To make matters worse, the recent economic slow down of China have 
undermined the previous optimism emerging from the “the dreamers” school 
(the name taken from Zhongguo meng/China dream book and concept,). The 
“dreamers” school claimed the world already entered the „post-American era” 
where USA is being considered a declining superpower that sooner or later 
will give way to China (Liu Mingfu, 2015). The 2015 mini-crisis reminded 
“the dreamers” the wisdom of Deng Xiaoping’s “do not raise your heads” [bu 
dan tou] formula (Shambaugh, 2014, p. 5). China is “waking up from the 
Chinese dream” (Góralczyk, 2015) now and it forces Beijing elites to return 
to low profile policy and turn to pragmatic economists like Chi Fulin again 
who calls for „the second reform” (Di er ci gaige), meaning more social justice 
instead of development (ibidem). These domestic turbulences raise questions 
on whether China (naturally concentrated on domestic issues) would be able 
and willing to engage more in CEE region if the priorities are clearly at home.
Moreover, the fulfillment of the OBOR depends not only on conditions 
in Eurasia but on Sino-American relations, too. So far “American can live 
with 1+16”, because the scale of this project is minor (from Washington’s per-
spective) and “The United States actively supports investment engagement 
with China”; however, “worries arise when the economic becomes political” 
(Babones, 2016). As shown above, this project is, or may become implicitly 
political. Given the lack of political subjectivity of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope and some of its countries’ predisposition to American advices (Poland, 
Baltic states), USA may find CEE a good place to block China’s further 
development. Therefore any deterioration of Sino-American relations in 
Asia-Pacific – be it in South China Sea or in Myanmar – should be observed 
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with anxieties by CEE elites, for such scenario increases chances for US po-
licymakers making negative attention to Chinese engagement in the region, 
which could effectively diminish or even cancel the whole OBOR idea. The 
more peaceful Asia-Pacific is the better for Central and Eastern Europe.
Furthermore, the last obstacle lies in the fact that there is no Central and 
Eastern Europe region as such. No regional identity exists and establishing 
artificial entities like 1+16 won’t create it – the difference between, say, Viseg-
rad group (itself very divided on Russia for example) and Balkans is too 
clearly visible (Turcsányi, Matura, Fürst, 2014, pp. 127–141). The divergent 
interests of those countries make establishing a common agenda on China 
very difficult. Contradiction of interests with Western Europe, itself very 
influential in CEE, makes even more difficult. The Western European elites 
already started calling against Chinese investments in the region and un-
dermining it by evoking such ideological factors as human rights (Johnston, 
2016) or by making European Parliament recommends against granting 
China “market economy status” (European Parliament…, 2016). Should the 
OBOR project materialize in a more concrete way this kind of opposition is 
likely to enhance. In these circumstances any unification of this region even 
under such promising idea as cooperation with China seems problematic 
at best. This lack of unity means that Central and Eastern Europe lacks any 
vision of cooperation, any clear idea of how the region sees Chinese plans, 
and what common policy are the CEE countries planning to conduct with 
regard to Beijing. This is important particularly because of one reason. CEE is 
already very much constrained in its policy towards China by some of CEE’s 
countries membership in EU (legal issues, trade regulations etc.); where 
member states still enjoy their full sovereignty, like education or culture, 
are being developed mostly on a bilateral level” (Turcsányi, Matura, Fürst, 
2014, pp. 127–141) – and instead of cooperating, they compete for Chinese 
attentions.
This example shows that rivalry for Chinese investments between CEE 
countries, not cooperation or partnership, is a more likely scenario. Instead 
of a united approach there are individual states polices (Hungarian, Latvian, 
Serbian, Czech) and their ambitions to play the leading role (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland). Naturally, for China this lack of CEE unity is not a bad 
news per se, for Beijing can play off one country against another in the best 
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“divide and conquer” tradition and play on their hopes for becoming the 
leader. If the region wants to make this “structural development” however, it 
must unite, at least for some projects like via Carpathia. So far these hopes 
for united approach remain a wishful thinking.
Without united approach and a vision of cooperation with China, the 
region may just become an economic “no man’s land” on the OBOR. The 
Chinese trains and cargo would pass it by on the way to Western Europe. No 
benefits would materialize for CEE, and the regional geopolitical position 
instead of improving would deteriorate. CEE region needs to know what to 
want and how to cooperate with China in details – what niches are to be 
fulfilled, what products can be sold to China and what are the real areas of 
possible cooperation. Contrary to some optimists’ claim that China’s enter 
to CEE would automatically improve the region’s stance, the situation on the 
ground is more nuanced.
Forecasted (of hoped) Chinese capital’s inflow into CEE will not be like 
waving a magic wand that would make CEE region escape middle income 
trap (as to do so, a country needs shifting toward higher-added value services 
and products). This happens out of few reasons. First, the Chinese presence 
in the region is so far not impressive – for example in V4 countries, “when 
measured economically, China is in a number of aspects behind other East 
Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan” (Turcsányi, Matura, 
Fürst, 2014, pp. 127–141) and so far “much of Chinese influence comes 
from the expectations held around the region about the ‘massive’ increase 
in economic interaction, most recently especially in the form of received 
investments”; this hasn’t however, transferred into “significant increase of 
economic activities or new investments, which could be explained by the 
recent increase in political activities” (ibidem). Second, China is not and has 
never been a charitable organization – it is a serious state that cares for its 
own profits only. The Chinese strategy is based on finding and taking over 
the best existing companies and on establishing necessary infrastructure for 
Chinese commercial purpose (Jakóbowski, 2015). Third, in the FDI, there 
is “a fundamental contradiction between Chinese and Central European 
intentions” and “both sides are looking for something different, which is 
a fundamental problem” (Turcsányi, Matura, Fürst, 2014, pp. 127–141). This 
results in numbers that are not optimistic: “Chinese investment in the Central 
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and Eastern European (CEE) region constitutes quite a small share in China’s 
total FDI in Europe (around 10%)” (Szunomar, 2015). The reasons of this 
lies in the fact that China is mostly “looking for infrastructure investment 
opportunities (preferably through governmental public procurements), most 
CEE countries are keen to attract greenfield investments in order to create 
jobs and industrial production”; that is why “China has barely set up any new 
facilities in the region – Chinese companies rather pursued acquisitions or 
infrastructure building opportunities; Central European EU member states 
can apply for non-refundable financial support for infrastructure devel-
opment; therefore Chinese loans are not attractive, while any attempts to 
pay off Chinese construction companies from European funds might likely 
provoke political turbulences” (Turcsányi, Matura, Fürst, 2014, p. 127–141). 
If we add unfair Chinese competition, including “dumping” the detritus of 
its industrial overcapacity in Europe (Johnston, 2016), then the risk scale 
would be seen clearly.
That is why as long as CEE region won’t create a concrete agenda on 
cooperation with China, it risks marginalizing and following that scenario: 
the Chinese would build railways, roads, bridges, and ports, using Chinese 
labor for Chinese capital, Chinese goods, and Chinese profits. In that case, 
ultimately, CEE would rather lose than win on cooperation with China – it 
would be overwhelmed by China and/or Western European companies and 
might just end up as non important transit point.
Successful cooperation with China might not be easy, too, given the lack 
of knowledge in dealing with China and Chinese companies in the region. 
This is not about cultural differences as such (because if one may general-
ize, then CEE societies seem to be much more conservative than Western 
European ones; for example one sociological survey from Poland on “Asian 
values” from 2000s showed that Polish society is much more “Confucian” 
than the Chinese or Korean ones (Jelonek, 2014, pp. 86–121) but rather 
the lack of knowledge on Chinese business style, business philosophy and 
practice or business ethics which is very different from the European one. 
This clash of styles and business cultures may produce damaging results, 
like the ones in the story of Chinese company Covec in Poland which after 
disagreeing with Polish partners, abandoned the A2 highway (both Covec 
and Polish partners blamed each other for the dispute; the nature of which 
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was rather of a misunderstanding than a purposely hostile action). Covec 
story has ingrained itself in Polish social psyche and strengthened the social 
anti-Chinese resentments, already present due to ideological reasons (such 
as Tibet, human rights etc.) which dominated the narrative on China in 
Poland throughout 1990s and 2000s. That is why the importance of educa-
tion and frequent business and people-to-people contacts between Chinese 
companies and Central and Eastern European ones cannot be overestimated.
To summarize the real obstacles in one sentence, the final outcome of 
“Chinese entry” into CEE for the region depends on overcoming technical 
difficulties, domestic situation in China, international dynamism in East 
Asia but mostly on CEE region abilities to deal with China and with Chinese 
companies.
Three boards
China’s OBOR initiative may bring to Central and Eastern Europe a politi-
cally new situation. Political leaders for CEE will now be forced to fight for 
their countries’ interests on three different political boards (Lubina, 2016). 
The first board is security. In the deteriorating global security conditions of 
more and more unstable world and growing assertiveness of Russia some 
CEE countries (Poland, Baltic countries) turn to the United States in hope 
that US would strengthen its military involvement in the region to deter 
Russia; that means the need to weaken US willingness to leave Europe and 
focus entirely on Asia-Pacific. At the same time other CEE countries (like 
Czech Republic) are caution over growing US military involvement (Lyman, 
2016). The second board is economy, or European Union. The 2014–2020 
EU budget would be the last one intended to support the newly EU states, 
so the CEE countries must, at all cost, keep the structural and financial 
support from EU. This may be difficult given the deteriorating circumstances: 
financial and migrant crisis – or to be correct, seven simultaneous crises that 
undermine EU abilities (Góralczyk, 2015) – and the uneasy reality of steadily 
dissolving Union. The third board that may emerge is China entering to 
Central and Eastern Europe (naturally this board will not be as important 
as the two others, at least in the short- and middle-term period). It’s a great 
opportunity but also a great challenge – CEE must make us of this chance to 
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make further development; at the same time it must not allow to be exploited 
or/and abandoned. This all produces a complex web of interests that are 
contradictory in one sphere and complimentary in other: these three boards 
sometimes overlap each other, sometimes are contrary to one another, and 
at other times are supplementary.
Conclusion
The described above situation fits into proposed theoretical pattern of asym-
metry in favour of China. At the same time, however, it is a stable relationship, 
because this asymmetry can be classified as “normalized asymmetry” or 
“positive asymmetry”. Such asymmetry exists when the relations are not 
without strains, but both sides are confident of fulfilling their basic interests 
and/or expectations of mutual benefits. In other words, benefits (or hopes 
of benefits) outweigh the losses and both sides consider this situation worth 
keeping. China-CEE asymmetry, too, is an asymmetry where both China 
and CEE countries approach is “open”. Beijing promotes a stable asymmetric 
relationship and strives to minimize misperception and increase involvement 
in its relations. This suggests a possible future success.
From CEE’s regional perspective, China’s enter to Central and Eastern 
Europe under the banner of OBOR initiative is a new phenomenon that 
revives the old “opportunity vs. threat” dilemma. For the region this is 
a chance to bandwagon to Chinese growth, to make further development 
and infrastructural revolution, to become a potential hub. The success is 
uncertain, however. China is not a charitable organization; it aims at boos-
ting Chinese infrastructure exports, taking over the best existing companies 
and creating the necessary infrastructure for Chinese commercial purposes 
which hardly fits into CEE countries’ interests. That is why CEE regional 
leaders should approach Chinese side well-prepared. Ultimately, the outcome 
for the region depends mostly on its abilities to deal with China and with 
Chinese companies.
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